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Service-oriented architectures (SOA) provide companies with dynamic IT infrastructures to adapt business processes flexibly 
to new requirements. However, the success of SOA will also depend on the ability to manage risk resulting from frequent and 
context-specific changes of IT support for automated business processes. Assessing this IT risk is challenging, since 
frequently changing relations between the causes of risk and their effects on business processes turns established methods for 
assessing risk into a game of hazard. Following a design science approach, this contribution proposes a novel approach for 
taking changes of cause-effect relations into consideration. Based on a  backward-directed recalculation of historical loss 
data, a risk-adjusted loss database is generated that can provide a more realistic basis for assessing IT risk. 
Keywords  
IT risk, service-oriented architecture, automated business processes 
CONSIDERING IT RISK – THE CHALLENGE 
The ability to adapt business processes flexibly to customers’ changing demands is regarded as an important attribute for 
companies in order to distinguish themselves from competitors and to realize competitive advantages (e.g. Brynjolfsson and 
Hitt, 1998; Jaisingh and Rees, 2001; McAfee and Brynjolfsson, 2008; Sanchez, 1995). Current technological developments 
such as service-oriented architectures (SOA), Cloud Computing, or Software as a Service provide a suitable technological 
basis for the automation of business processes and for gaining the aspired flexibility (e.g. Hayes, 2008; Krafzig, Banke, 
Slama, 2005; Mills, 2007). However, increasing automation and flexibility of business processes does not just improve 
business process performance. It also places particular emphasis on changing IT risk resulting from deficient and inadequate 
technical support of the business processes.  
Present approaches for assessing risk lack methods for taking context-specific orchestration and rearrangement of services 
into consideration and thus inherently ignore the frequently changing relations between the causes of IT risk and its 
(monetary) effects on each instance of business processes. The approach presented in this contribution aims at providing 
management with more accurate risk information by taking flexible and frequently changing IT support explicitly into 
consideration. 
The contribution is structured as follows: in the second section, a short definition of IT risk is given and existing approaches 
for assessing IT risk in a flexible IT support are discussed. Furthermore, the IT Risk Reference Model is introduced, 
providing a structured way to describe cause-effect relations and changes within it. Based on this model, in the third section, 
our proposal for organizing a loss data base and taking changes within cause-effect relations into consideration is presented. 
The paper closes with a short discussion on the limitations of our approach and the identification of open research issues. 
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MODELING CAUSE-EFFECT RELATIONS FOR IT RISKS 
IT risk management focuses on the examination and assessment of risks (quantifiable and known states) rather than on 
uncertainties. There is no common definition of IT risk in related literature (e.g. Salvati and Diergardt, 2007). While some 
authors (e.g. Parker, 2007) concentrate on the so-called “long-tail” risks that occur with low frequency and high impact, the 
majority (e.g. BSI, 2005; Muehlen and Rosemann, 2005) define IT risk as the probability of damage excluding the amount of 
loss (Alter and Sherer, 2004). From a value-oriented view, IT risk is seen as a part of operational risks (Faisst and Prokein, 
2008), measuring the unexpected losses that are determined by the frequency and amount of losses, e.g. by their value at risk 
(e.g. Holton, 2003; Jaisingh and Rees, 2001). Such a loss-oriented view is seen as suitable for IT risk and thus adopted in this 
contribution. In the context of automated business processes IT risks are seen as the unexpected losses resulting from 
deficient and inadequate technical support of the business processes, e.g. by non-availability or non-integrity of an IT service. 
Such IT risk can result in high financial damage, considerably outperforming other operational risks (Hechenblaikner, 2006). 
Several methods are available for measuring IT risk. At best, a quantification of IT risk reverts to a set of past cases of loss 
collected over several periods (e.g., McNeil, A., Frey, R. and Embrechts, 2005). As long as the relation between causes and 
effects remains (relatively) constant, the expected frequency and amount of losses can be derived by interpolation from an 
analysis of the individual cases collected or external data collections. However, each change makes such past data 
increasingly inaccurate and, strictly speaking, requires a new quantification of the risks under consideration. The usual 
assumption that programmed business processes are executed without error or at least with a known risk (see, e.g., (Ellis, 
1999; Giaglis, 2001)) becomes increasingly unsustainable. In practice, effects of significant changes within the cause-effect 
relations are usually estimated by a personal, “expert”-based overall adjustment of either the distributions of frequency of 
loss cases or the distribution of loss amounts (see, e.g., (Gordon and Loeb, 2002; Mercuri, 2003)). Since company-specific 
relations between causes and effects of risks are usually neither constant nor to be described or modeled as direct correlations  
these approaches are insufficient for adequately assessing the actual risk situation in the context of automated and flexible 
business processes. For estimating “frequent and small” changes, no practical method is available yet (Sackmann, 2008a) and 
an adequate risk assessment mainly lacks adequate risk models and a stressable data base (Alter and Sherer, 2004; Blakely, 
McDermott and Geer, 2001; Jaisingh and Rees, 2001; Salvati and Diergardt, 2007). In this paper, a novel approach for 
modeling cause-effect-relations of IT risk and designing an according loss data base is proposed. Since this requires new 
methods and artifacts, our research follows the design science paradigm (Denning, 1997; Hevner, March, Park, Ram, 2004; 
Tsichritzis, 1998) aiming at an efficient and effective enlargement of human and organizational capabilities.  
Our approach takes the current IT situation as starting point. The management of IT risk in the context of flexible business 
processes supported by IT requires a method for taking changing cause-effect relations directly into consideration. For this 
purpose, the IT Risk Reference Model has been proposed (see Figure 1) combining core aspects of IT security with process-
oriented risk assessment for modeling the relations between causes, i.e. potential attacks (threats) and the effects, i.e. the parts 
of a business process that are disturbed. From a mainly technological and IT security view, threats could be classical security 
threats, such as hacker attacks or viruses. If realized, these threats result in a violation of protection goals of the supported 
business process, i.e. confidentiality, integrity or availability (Rörig, 2007). From a more organizational view, threats could 
also be malfunction of the IT, force majeure, or unsuccessful software updates (e.g. BSI, 2005).  
Business Process (BP)













goals disturb the business
process and have (usually




Figure 1: IT Risk Reference Model (Sackmann, 2008b) 
For modeling the relations between causes and effects, our first approach distinguishes four different aspects: 
1) The set of all (parts of) business processes (BP) that can be modeled with their associated procedures and activities 
independently from the underlying information system (Giaglis, 2001). Enclosed activities using at least one IT 
application for their realization are regarded as independent elements and modeled as:  
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 (1) BP = {BP1, …, BPC}      with C = total number of BP elements 
 
2) The set of IT applications (AP) with their underlying IT infrastructure that are used from the defined elements of the 
business process. For reasons of simplicity, an aggregated view is used in this contribution. The application elements are 
modeled as:  
 (2) AP = {AP1, …, APD}     with D = total number of AP elements   
 
3) Since the IT applications are relevant points of failure in the context of IT risk, vulnerabilities (VN) of the IT 
applications are the next group of elements. Vulnerabilities are seen as a “bridge” between business processes and IT 
threats because they are both the loophole for attacks and the cause of disturbance of business processes. Thus, 
vulnerabilities are interpreted as independent “elements” that can be associated to at least one IT application and are 
formalized as:  
 (3) VN = {VN1, …, VNE}     with E = total number of VN elements  
 
4) The fourth group of elements represents all potential attacks that threaten the business processes. These threats (TH) are 
seen as causes of IT risk and highly related to the identified vulnerabilities. They are formalized as:  
 (4)  TH = {TH1, …, THF}     with F = total number of TH elements 
 
Within these groups of elements, the basic relations between the causes and effects can be modeled providing a “snapshot” of 
the cause-effect relations for any time. It might be argued that focusing on only these four aspects on such an aggregated 
level is oversimplifying and, of course, business processes are more than a container for tasks as well as applications and 
their vulnerabilities can result from various sources like middleware, operating systems, or hardware. However, when 
contemplating from a data perspective, the IT Risk Reference Model is already quite ambitious. Specifying relations between 
risk causes and effects according to the four proposed aspects already requires a sophisticated information and risk 
management of the company under consideration. The identification of the various elements could be operated especially for 
SOA, e.g., by analyzing BPEL (Business Process Execution Language) files, service repository, service registry, and routing 
tables of an Enterprise Service Bus (ESB), WSDL (Web Service Description Language) documents, or code of single web 
services. Furthermore, if available, the integration of an IT configuration management database might support an automated 
modeling of existing cause-effect relations and its changes. For identifying relevant vulnerabilities, information from IT 
security management or from public vulnerability databases (e.g. CVSS) as well as internal databases and documentations 
can be used (Sackmann, Lowis and Kittel, 2009). Therefore, the IT Risk Reference Model is seen as a novel way to structure 
the relations between causes and effects of risk that is more accurate than a simple correlation coefficient but still operational. 
It is an open model that can be extended with new elements and relations, e.g. if new activities in the business project are 
introduced, new IT services are integrated into the business process, new vulnerabilities are detected, or new threats become 
known. Thus, it can provide a first concept to a risk manager for aligning information management of a company and to also 
improve the assessment of the actual IT risk situation. If more detailed data is available, it will facilitate a more detailed 
modeling than proposed in this contribution.  
The relations between the different aspects of the IT Risk Reference Model can then be formally described in the form of 
matrices: the relations between the business processes and the IT applications with the matrix BP x AP, between the IT 
applications and the vulnerabilities with the matrix AP x VN, and between the vulnerabilities and the threats with the matrix 
VN x TH. Applying the IT Risk Reference Model to a company’s business processes and IT support requires an additional 
concept to define how the relations between the elements are formally modeled. Certainly the simplest approach to define, 
e.g., the relation li,j between the business process activity BPi and the IT application APj is to model them in a binary manner 
as:   
(5) li,j ∈ {0,1} ∀ i∈{1, …, C} ∧ j∈{1, …, D} 
where “0” means “there is no relation, the business process activity BPi does not rely on the IT application APj” and “1” 
means “there is a relation, the business process activity BPi does rely on the IT application APj”. In this manner, the relations 
between AP and VN elements (mi,j) as well as the relations between VN and TH elements (ni,j) can also be described. For a 
short discussion of possible ways to identify the relevant relations, see (Sackmann, 2008b). To keep the model simple and 
with automated detection and measuring of changes in mind, in this contribution the binary approach is proposed for all three 
matrices. On a general level, this does not change the aspired modeling and systematic integration of cause-effect relations 
into IT risk management. However, if the required data is available, the relations can also be described in a more precise 
manner, for example in the form of probabilities, probability distributions or even conditional probabilities setting up a 
Bayesian network (Alexander, 2003). 
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For modeling cause-effect relations, the focus is not directed on single relations between elements of different groups but on 
existing paths, i.e. links between single threats and business processes. Focusing on paths seems to be advantageous since, 
e.g., patching a vulnerability of an IT application means a change to the cause-effect relations only if the vulnerability can 
also be exploited by an attack. Thus, the fact of patching alone does not necessarily imply a change of IT risk: if the relevant 
vulnerability is already protected by a security mechanism, the additional patching of the IT application has no further effect. 
Thus, only changes that also alter the paths between threats (causes) and business processes (effects) have to be taken into 
consideration. Formally, the sought paths Λ can be calculated as matrix BP x TH by simply multiplying the matrices of the 
IT Risk Reference Model and normalizing it:  






















       { }1,0, ∈Λ∀ fc  
Each path is then characterized by its interlinked elements:  
 (7)  { }ggggg THVNAPBP ,,,=Λ       { }Gg ...,,1∈∀   with G = number of paths. 
FROM HISTORICAL LOSS EVENTS TO AN ADJUSTED LOSS DATABASE 
Taking changing cause-effect relations into consideration does not aim at changing the “traditional” IT risk management 
process – it just opens a new way for building up a more adequate historical loss data base (HLDB) as fundament for the 
quantification of IT risk by established methods, e.g. by performing a Monte Carlo Simulation to combining the distributions 
of frequency of loss cases and the distributions of loss amounts.  
The basic idea is not only to record, e.g., date, risk category, and monetary loss but to extend the data model of present loss 
data bases by the actual cause-effect relation that sparked off the loss event. Thus, building up such an extended HLDB 
would require the identified cause of risk (threat) for each path involved to be recorded as well as the corresponding 
vulnerability, the IT application, and the business process that have a share in the loss event. Furthermore, a maximal loss, 
e.g. represented by the value added of the harmed business process, should also be recorded. 
The resultant database extends recent historical loss data bases with an explicit assignment of the underlying cause-effect 
relations for each registered loss event. This allows changes within the IT infrastructure and IT support of business processes 
to be retraced. As discussed in the following section, an extended HLDB provides a promising starting point to generate a 
new adjusted loss data base (ALDB) that can be used from existing methods for calculating IT risk reflecting the actual IT 
situation and, thus, achieving a more accurate assessment of IT risk. For generating such an ALDB that gives information 
about “what loss would have occurred if the present cause-effect relations had been in place in former times”, it is proposed 
to revaluate each single historical loss event after every change of the cause-effect relations. In the following, a method for 
the revaluation of historical loss events is proposed. The method contains four phases, i.e. (1) identifying the cause-effect 
relations of historical loss events and generating the HLDB accordingly, (2) identifying changes of the cause-effect relations 
and categorizing new paths, (3) assessing the new paths, and (4) transforming the HLDB into the ALDB. These four phases 
are presented and discussed in the following. For a better understanding, the modus operandi is demonstrated using a 
hypothetical example. 
Phase 1: Generating the HLDB  
The first phase requires the identification of all historical known paths within the actual cause-effect relations that are under 
evaluation. Assuming a simplified company consisting of merely three business processes that are realized by three services 
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Figure 2: Example of cause-effect relations and paths 
In total, five paths can be identified and the respective HLDB is filled with relevant loss events. An extract of an exemplified 
HLDB is shown in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Example of an extended historic loss database (HLDB) 
For calculating the relative loss factor, it is assumed that the maximal loss that could occur is given by the value added of the 
instance of the business process under consideration. From a business perspective, this assumption might be unrealistic; 
however, it can be replaced by any other value representing a maximal loss of a business process instance. A further point to 
be discussed in future work is the splitting of individual loss events in the case where more than one path is responsible. If 
there are, e.g., two paths between one threat and one business process (like the paths Λ4 and Λ5 between the threat TH2 and 
the business process BP3 in Figure 2), it is necessary to split the occurred loss and to assign for each path a corresponding 
share. In our example, this is done by equal proportions (see Table 1). 
Phase 2: Identification and Categorization of New Paths 
If time elapses, changes of the cause-effect relations are possible. As described in phase 1, the paths of a new situation have 
to be identified. All identified paths then have to be analyzed as to whether they are “known” paths, i.e. whether recorded 
events within the HLDB already exist that have the identical path. If there is a “new” path, corresponding historical data for 
assessing risk is lacking and a method for estimating the resulting IT risk is required. 
Although there are no directly corresponding and already quantified loss events existing for new paths, the HLDB indirectly 
provides a rich source for estimating the effects of the new path on IT risk. For identifying the most relevant data within the 
HLDB, it has been proposed to analyze similarities of paths. Following this concept, we suggest to define similarity of paths 
for the present according to the set of elements Ψg two paths have in common. Assuming that two paths with three identical 
elements are more similar than two paths with only two identical elements and that two paths with two identical elements are 
more similar than two paths with only one identical element, three types of similarity can be distinguished. It is further 
assumed that two paths which have identical elements of directly related layers, e.g. between BP and AP or AP and VN, are 
more similar than two paths that have identical elements of not directly linked elements, e.g. between BP and VN or AP and 
TH. Making this difference leads to the following five categories of similarity (visualized in Figure 3): 
• Similarity of Type I between two paths Λa and Λb is given when three identical elements exist.   
(8)    Type Ia:      { } { }gggggggg THVNAPVNAPBP ,,,, =Ψ∨=Ψ  bgag Λ∈Ψ∧Λ∈Ψ∧   
(9)    Type Ib:      { } { }gggggggg THVNBPTHAPBP ,,,, =Ψ∨=Ψ  bgag Λ∈Ψ∧Λ∈Ψ∧   
Path  Value 
(g) Add ed
2 1.11. 14 :30 1 1 1 1 1 3 50 0 38 0
2 1 1 1 2 9 000 2160
3 1 1 2 3 6 50 0 32 00
17:54 4 2 2 2 3 750 0 12 00
5 2 2 3 3 750 0 12 00
2 2.11. 09 :12 4 2 2 2 3 120 00 49 00
5 2 2 3 3 120 00 49 00
13 :47 1 1 1 1 1 3 200 12 00
2 1 1 1 2 3 000 19 00
3 1 1 2 3 8 70 0 39 70
14 :58 4 2 2 2 3 770 0 38 50
5 2 2 3 3 770 0 38 50
19 :19 1 1 1 1 1 2 900 750
2 1 1 1 2 4 000 32 00
3 1 1 2 3 6 000 34 00
2 4.11. 18 :46 1 1 1 1 1 3 400 12 60
2 1 1 1 2 130 00 50 90
3 1 1 2 3 4 000 1700
2 5.11. 11:13 4 2 2 2 3 700 0 98 0
5 2 2 3 3 700 0 98 0
2 7.11. 14 :58 4 2 2 2 3 8 900 33 80
5 2 2 3 3 8 900 33 80
L ossDate Tim e
P a th  
C o mpo nents
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• Similarity of Type II between two paths Λa and Λb is given when two identical elements exist.  





VNAPAPBP ,, =Ψ∨=Ψ  { } Λ∈Ψ∧Λ∈Ψ∧=Ψ∨ gagggg THVN ,   
(11)    Type IIb: { } { }gggggg THAPVNBP ,, =Ψ∨=Ψ  { } bgagggg THBP Λ∈Ψ∧Λ∈Ψ∧=Ψ∨ ,  
• Similarity of Type III between two paths Λa and Λb is given when only one identical element exists and is formally 
described as follows:  
(12)    Type III: BPa = BPb
 or APa = APb or VNa = VNb or THa = THb 
 
„New “ Pat h
Type I 

































Figure 3: Categories of similarity of two paths 



































Figure 4: Example of changed cause-effect relations and corresponding new  
A new connection between BP3 and AP1 occurs and so a new path Λnew evolves. Using the categorization already introduced, 
two paths can be found in the HLDB which have three elements from directly linked layers in common (Λ1 and Λ2). So the 
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Figure 5: New path with similarity of type Ia 
Phase 3: Assessment of New Paths  
In the third phase, identified new paths within the cause-effect relations are valuated. All loss events of the HLDB that had 
been identified as being similar to a new path Λnew are used as basis for this valuation. Since the effect of a loss event is 
limited in its general validity, it is proposed to use relative instead of absolute loss. Therefore, for any loss event, a relative 




RL =  
To determine the relative loss of the a path RL(Λnew), the arithmetic mean of all relevant similar paths Λk’s loss events within 
the HLSB is calculated as follows: 
 



























,   
with  K = number of different relevant paths Λk within HLDB that are of identified similarity to Λnew with k = 1,…, K  
Qk = number of loss events an underlying path Λk has within HLDB with qk  as the order number of the relevant loss 
events with qk = 1,…,Qk  
  ( )
kqk









To explain in more detail, the business processes of the exemplary company from above are again reverted to. The new path 
Λnew (Type Ia) has two similar paths within the HLDB (K = 2), namely Λ1 and Λ2. For path Λ1, four loss events within the 
HLDB (Q1 = 4) as well as for Λ2 (Q2 = 4) can be found. For calculating RL(Λnew) formula (14) results in the following: 










RL new  
with 
RL(Λk, qk) qk = 1 qk = 2 qk = 3 qk = 4 
Λ1 0.11 0.38 0.26 0.37 
Λ2 0.24 0.63 0.80 0.39 
Table 2: Relative losses of the relevant paths  
Phase 4: Filling up the ALDB 
In the fourth phase, the aspired ALDB is created containing “new” loss events representing the actual cause-effect relations 
within the IT supported business processes and provides an adjusted data basis for risk calculation methods. For generating 
the ALDB, in a first step, all recorded loss events of the HLDB that are existent and have unchanged cause-effect relations 
are directly copied to the ALDB. This is necessary, since an identical attack is expected to result in an identical loss. All 
historical loss events whose cause-effect relations are no longer existent, e.g. because a vulnerability has been patched, will 
not appear in the ALDB. Not only the absolute loss amount is transferred to the ALDB, but also the calculated relative loss 
for each single path as explained in phase 2. In a second step, anywhere a threat is found that is also relevant for a new path, 
the ALDB is extended by a corresponding row, showing the new cause-effect relation. The applying loss has to be calculated 
by multiplying the estimated RL (section 3.3) with the corresponding value added of the relevant business process.  
In Table 3, this is demonstrated reviving the example from above: most loss events (not shaded) are direct copies of loss 
events of the HLDB. Further the ALDB is extended by the corresponding loss events of the new path (shaded) whenever 
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threat 1 appears. For estimating the absolute loss that the occurrence of threat 1 would have had if path Λnew had already been 
in place at the moment of occurrence, the expected loss is calculated by multiplying the respective value added of the 
business process concerned (BP3) with the calculated average relative loss of the new path (here 0.4). In a further check, it 













21.11. 14:30 1 1 1 1 1 3500 380 0,11
2 1 1 1 2 9000 2160 0,24
3 1 1 2 3 6500 3200 0,49
new 1 1 1 3 6500 2600 0,40
17:54 4 2 2 2 3 7500 1200 0,16
5 2 2 3 3 7500 1200 0,16
22.11. 09:12 4 2 2 2 3 12000 4900 0,41
5 2 2 3 3 12000 4900 0,41
13:47 1 1 1 1 1 3200 1200 0,38
2 1 1 1 2 3000 1900 0,63
3 1 1 2 3 8700 3970 0,46
new 1 1 1 3 8700 3480 0,40
14:58 4 2 2 2 3 7700 3850 0,50
5 2 2 3 3 7700 3850 0,50
19:19 1 1 1 1 1 2900 750 0,26
2 1 1 1 2 4000 3200 0,80
3 1 1 2 3 6000 3400 0,57
new 1 1 1 3 6000 2400 0,40
24.11. 18:46 1 1 1 1 1 3400 1260 0,37
2 1 1 1 2 13000 5090 0,39
3 1 1 2 3 4000 1700 0,43
new 1 1 1 3 4000 1600 0,40
25.11. 11:13 4 2 2 2 3 7000 980 0,14
5 2 2 3 3 7000 980 0,14
27.11. 14:58 4 2 2 2 3 8900 3380 0,38
5 2 2 3 3 8900 3380 0,38  
Table 3: Example of an adapted loss data base (ALDB)  
Of course, this is only a first and possibly not yet adequate approach to estimate the monetary effect and is still subject to 
improvement. A more adequate method to obtain this value might improve the estimation results, however it would not 
change the approach presented in general. Thus, the ALDB reflects – according to the actual new situation – to some degree 
historic loss events and to another revaluated loss events according to the new cause-effect relations. Such an ALDB is 
expected to provide a more accurate database due to the actual cause-effect relations and thus improve the precision of IT risk 
quantification and hence the management of IT risk. 
Discussion and Limitations 
The approach presented in this contribution provides a first systematic approach to taking fast-changing cause-effect relations 
in dynamically IT-supported business processes into consideration when assessing IT risk. Since one main focus lies on the 
applicability of the approach and its implementation in real information systems, there are several trade-offs with accuracy. It 
provides a systematic approach rather than a finished model and thus involves limitations of considerable importance.  
From a business view, the value added of a single (part of a) business process to determine the maximal amount of loss a 
loss event could cause is proposed in this contribution. Although this measure can be derived relatively easily from 
controlling systems, it might not necessarily be the best measure. Of course, the fix amount could be replaced from instance 
to instance by actual amounts and the method for estimating the expected loss of new paths extended accordingly. 
Alternatively, other values, such as transaction volume in a purchase process as well as a more differentiated view on loss, 
e.g. direct versus indirect losses, could be taken into consideration. Such modifications would not change the underlying 
approach of backward-oriented assessment presented here. However, they are seen as valuable information and should be 
analyzed according to their improvement of risk assessment. A further assessing issue occurs in the case of complex cause-
effect relations, i.e. when a loss event is aligned to more than one single path. In this case, since in our approach it is 
proposed to record loss events according to the paths involved instead of recording the loss event in total, a method is 
required that allows the total loss amount to be divided amongst the paths involved. An objective method to do so is still 
subject to further research. 
A second limitation is the fact that only elements of the modeled cause-effect relations can be taken into consideration 
having been involved in a historical loss event at least once. New or formerly unknown elements can be integrated. However, 
they have to be assessed in an alternative way, e.g. by expert estimations. 
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A third limitation can be found within the historical loss database itself. In a historical loss database, usually only those 
events are recorded that finally result in a (financial) loss. This might cause a bias, since threats that had been realized but not 
resulted in a financial loss are not recorded. If a changed cause-effect relation leads to a previous threat becoming relevant, 
the loss events belonging to the threat cannot be taken into consideration. To solve this problem, it would be necessary to also 
record all those events in the historical loss database that are caused by a known threat, irrespective of whether it resulted in a 
loss or not. Alternatively, the likelihood of loss events could be derived from external data or expert estimation. However, 
this would require manual adjustment of historical data and go against the aimed automation of risk revaluation. 
From an IT security view, attacks that exploit different vulnerabilities in combination are of high practical relevance. 
Such attacks cannot be modeled by using the IT Risk Reference Model directly. For taking combined attacks into 
consideration too, it is therefore proposed to interpret them as independent threats and thus to indirectly integrate them into 
the IT Risk Reference Model.  
Although taking cause-effect relations into consideration seems a plausible way to improve risk assessment, the next 
outstanding step is a proof of concept and an empirical evaluation of the presented approach. While the first is the subject of 
a current research project, the latter requires an extended database with historical loss events for several periods according to 
the HLDB presented in section 3. Therefore, in the next step, a first evaluation will be made by simulation tools and by 
comparing the results with common overall adjustment methods. Irrespective of the results, it seems advisable to any 
company with highly integrated information systems and/or building up flexible technologies such as service-oriented 
architectures to think about measuring risk and to build up a well-documented and expressive loss database. Taking account 
of the flexible cause-effect relations and integrating information about them into the whole risk management process seems a 
viable proposition. This is an open research field. However, the approach presented in this paper might serve as a good 
starting point. 
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